1. Introduction
Opponents of the corporal punishment of
children are rightly critical of its extensive use and the severity with
which it is all too often inflicted. They have been at pains to show
that corporal punishment is not used merely as a last resort, but is
inflicted regularly and for the smallest of infractions.1 They have also
recorded the extreme harshness of many instances of corporal
punishment.2
I have no hesitation in joining the opposition to
such practices, which are correctly labeled as child abuse. Where I
believe that opponents of corporal punishment are wrong is in saying
that physical punishment should never be inflicted. The popular as well
as the educational and psychological debates about corporal punishment
are characterized largely by polarization. Those who are opposed want to
rule it out entirely. Those who are in favor tend to have a cavalier
defense of the practice that is insensitive to many reasonable concerns
about the dangers and abuses of this form of punishment.
It is
surprising that the moral question of corporal punishment has escaped
the attention of philosophers to the extent that it has. In this paper I
want to consider the various standard arguments that are advanced
against corporal punishment and show why they fail to establish the
conclusion in defense of which they are usually advanced -- that such
punishment should be entirely abandoned. However, in doing so I shall
show that some of the arguments have some force -- sufficient to impose
significant moral limitations on the use of corporal punishment --
thereby explaining, at least in part, why the abuses are beyond the
moral pale.
After examining and rejecting the arguments that
corporal punishment should be entirely eliminated, I shall briefly
consider some positive arguments for corporal punishment before
outlining what I take to be some requirements for its just infliction.
However, before turning to any of this, some preliminary remarks will
help to focus the subject matter I shall be discussing.
a. What is corporal punishment?
Corporal punishment is, quite literally, the infliction of punishment on the body.
Even once it is differentiated from "capital punishment," "corporal
punishment" remains a very broad term. It can be used to refer to a wide
spectrum of punishments ranging from forced labor to mutilating
torture. My focus in this paper will be on a form of corporal punishment
that seems to me to be the pivotal area of controversy --
the infliction of physical pain without injury.3
I am not suggesting that this is the most problematic form of corporal
punishment, but I shall focus on it because it seems to be the mildest
level of corporal punishment at which the disagreement enters.
Furthermore, the infliction of pain without injury appears to be the
variety of corporal punishment that is at stake in the debate, even
though opponents of corporal punishment make frequent reference to those
instances of corporal punishment that result in injury.
Corporal
punishment goes by a variety of names including, but not limited to,
"beating," "hitting," "spanking," "paddling," "swatting," and "caning."
Some of these terms are generic, others are specific to the severity of
the punishment or the instrument used to inflict it. I shall use some of
these terms interchangeably as general terms for corporal punishment.
b. Corporal punishment in homes and schools
There
are a number of settings in which corporal punishment has been used,
but my focus will be on homes and schools. These places share a number
of important features that together set them aside from other possible
settings for corporal punishment. In both homes and schools children are
punished by adults -- either parents or teachers. Similarly, in both
contexts punishment is often inflicted without formal trials and often
for nonstatutory offenses -- offenses that are not proscribed by some
home or school statute, but that are rather deemed (at least in the more
justifiable cases of punishment) to be moral wrongdoings.
There
are some significant differences between the home and school settings.
Parents are more likely to have their children's interests close to
heart and to love and care for them. Parents are also more likely to
know their children better than teachers know their pupils. Teachers,
after all, have relatively little contact with their pupils and the
little they do have is usually in large classes. While some people are
opposed to corporal punishment anywhere, even by parents in the home,
others oppose only its practice outside the home. They might suggest
that the differences between the home and the school are morally
relevant and show why corporal punishment would be acceptable in the
home but not in the school.
I do not think that the differences
support this conclusion. Institutional punishment can never replicate
the close connections of the family situation. That has some
disadvantages and some advantages. One of the advantages is that the
judgment of behavior and decision about punishment will not be blinded
by love. (How many parents would sentence their homicidal offspring to
lengthy prison terms? -- "He's a good boy really!")
Moreover, not
all institutional settings are equally impersonal. Schools are much more
personal than state courts. Teachers know their pupils better and are
likely to care more for them than judges do for the accuseds that stand
before them. Punishment in schools can thus be seen as serving a useful
educational purpose. It facilitates the move from the jurisdiction of
the family to the jurisdiction of the state, teaching the child that
punishment is not always inflicted by close people who love one and know
one. This is not to say that teachers, like judges, should not inquire
into relevant aspects of a wrongdoer's background before inflicting a
severe punishment.
2. Responding to Arguments Against Corporal Punishment
Those
who oppose corporal punishment do not normally do so on the basis of a
single argument. Usually they muster a battery of reasons to support
their view. They do not root their arguments in particular theories of
punishment -- theories that justify the institution of punishment -- and
say why corporal punishment fails to meet the theoretical requirements.
In many cases, this may be because they lack a theory of punishment.
However, it should be said in their favor that having a theory of
punishment is little help, by itself, in determining whether corporal
punishment is ever morally acceptable. This is because the traditional
theories of punishment in themselves do not commit one to accepting or
rejecting corporal punishment. A number of issues mediate the
application of the theories to the question of corporal punishment.
For example, for
consequentialist theories of punishment, the relevant considerations
include the effectiveness of corporal punishment, either as a deterrent
or reform, and the extent of any adverse side effects. For
retributivists, punishment is justified if it is deserved.
Retributivists are not concerned about the consequences of punishment,
but they do consider the means of punishment. Thus, an important
question for them is whether corporal punishment is an unacceptably
cruel or degrading form of punishment. Retributivism per se
says nothing about what constitutes an unacceptable form of punishment,
just as utilitarianism itself cannot tell what kinds of punishment are
effective or harmful. Thus we cannot turn to the theories themselves for
answers to these questions. I shall not probe the theoretical
foundations or venture any view about which theory of punishment is
correct. This is because I take the theoretical background to be largely
beyond the scope of this paper. There is a vast literature on whether
punishment can be justified and I cannot hope to contribute to that
here. Instead, I restrict my attention to the question of corporal
punishment.
The arguments raised by those who believe that
corporal punishment should never be inflicted are that corporal
punishment 1) leads to abuse; 2) is degrading; 3) is psychologically
damaging; 4) stems from and causes sexual deviance; 5) teaches the wrong
lesson; 6) arises from and causes poor relationships between teachers
(or parents) and children; and 7) does not deter. I shall now consider
each of these arguments in turn.4
a. Corporal punishment leads to abuse
Opponents
of corporal punishment make regular reference to the frequency and
severity of physical punishments that are inflicted upon children. They
suggest that corporal punishment "escalates into battering,"5 or at
least increases the risk that those who punish will "cross the line to
physical abuse."6
Clearly there are instances of abuse and of
abusive physical punishment. But that is insufficient to demonstrate
even a correlation between corporal punishment and abuse, and a fortiori
a causal relationship. Research into possible links between corporal
punishment and abuse has proved inconclusive so far. Some studies have
suggested that abusive parents use corporal punishment more than
nonabusive parents, but other studies have shown this not to be the
case.7 The findings of one study,8 conducted a year after corporal
punishment by parents was abolished in Sweden, suggested that Swedish
parents were as prone to serious abuse of their children as were parents
in the United States, where corporal punishment was (and is)
widespread. These findings are far from decisive, but they caution us
against hasty conclusions about the abusive effects of corporal
punishment.
The fact that there are some parents and teachers who
inflict physical punishment in an abusive way does not entail the
conclusion that corporal punishment should never be inflicted by
anybody. If it did have this entailment, then, for example, the
consumption of any alcohol by anybody prior to driving would have to be
condemned on the grounds that some people cannot control how much
alcohol they consume before driving. Just as we prohibit the excessive
but not the moderate use of alcohol prior to driving, so should we
condemn the abusive but not the nonabusive use of corporal punishment.
b. Corporal punishment is degrading
One
argument that is intended as an attack on both mild and severe cases of
corporal punishment makes the claim that physically punishing people
degrades them. I understand degradation to involve a lowering of
somebody's standing, where the relevant sense of standing has to do with
how others regard one, and how one regards oneself. It is the interplay
between the way we understand how others view us and the way that we
view ourselves that produces feelings such as shame. Thus one way in
which one might be degraded is by being shamed.
In order
to respond satisfactorily to the objection that corporal punishment is
degrading, clarification is required about whether the term "degrade" is
taken to have a
normative content, or, in other words,
whether it is taken to embody a judgment of wrongfulness. If it is not,
then it will not be sufficient to show that corporal punishment is
degrading. It will have to be shown that it is unacceptably so before it
can be judged to be wrong on those grounds. If, by contrast, "degrade"
is taken to embody a judgment of wrongfulness then a demonstration that
corporal punishment is degrading will suffice to show that it is wrong.
But then the argumentative work will have to be done in showing that
corporal punishment is degrading because it will have to be shown that
it amounts to an unacceptable lowering of somebody's standing.
Either way, the vexing question is whether corporal punishment involves an unacceptable lowering of somebody's standing.
Here
it is noteworthy that there are other forms of punishment that lower
people's standing even more than corporal punishment, and yet are not
subject to similar condemnation. Consider, for example, various
indignities attendant upon imprisonment, including severe invasions of
privacy (such as strip-searches and ablution facilities that require
relieving oneself in full view of others) as well as imposed
subservience to prison wardens, guards, and even to more powerful fellow
inmates. My intuitions suggest that this lowering of people's standing
surpasses that implicit in corporal punishment per se, even though it is
obviously the case that corporal punishment could be meted out in a
manner in which it were aggravated. If corporal punishment is wrong
because it involves violating the intimate zone of a person's body, then
surely the extreme invasions of prison inmates' privacy, which seem
worse, would also be wrong. It is true that corporal punishment
involves the application of direct and intense power to the body, but I
do not see how that constitutes a more severe lowering of somebody's
standing than employing indirect and mild power in the course of a
strip-search, for example. It is true too that the prison invasions of
privacy to which I have referred would be inflicted on adults whereas
corporal punishment would be imposed on children, but again I fail to
see how that difference makes physical punishment of children worse. In
the case of young children especially, it seems that the element of
shame would be less than that of adults given that the capacities for
shame increase between the time one is a toddler and the time one
becomes an adult.
Therefore,
if we think that current practices in prison life are not wrong on
grounds of degradation, then we cannot consistently say that all
corporal punishment is wrong on these grounds.
c. Corporal punishment is psychologically damaging
It
is claimed that corporal punishment has numerous adverse psychological
effects, including depression, inhibition, rigidity, lowered self-esteem
and heightened anxiety.9
Although there is evidence that
excessive corporal punishment can significantly increase the chances of
such psychological harm, most of the psychological data are woefully
inadequate to the task of demonstrating that mild and infrequent
corporal punishment has such consequences.
One opponent of corporal punishment who has provided data on even mild and infrequent physical chastisement is Murray Straus.10 His
research, which is much more sophisticated than most earlier
investigations into corporal punishment, does lend support to the view
that even infrequent noninjurious corporal punishment can increase one's
chances of being depressed. However, for two reasons this research is
inadequate to the task of demonstrating that mild corporal punishment is
wrong. First, the studies are not conclusive. The main methodological
problem is that the studies are not experiments but post facto
investigations based on self-reports.11 Murray Straus recognizes this12
but nevertheless thinks that the studies are compelling. The second
point is that even if Professor Straus's findings are valid, the nature
of the data is insufficiently marked to justify a moral condemnation of
mild and infrequent corporal punishment. For instance, the increase of
depression, according to his study, is not substantial for rare physical
punishment. The increments on his Mean Symptoms Index of depression are
only slight for one or two instances of corporal punishment during
one's teen years. The increments are somewhat more substantial for three
to nineteen incidents of corporal punishment but, surprisingly, for
twenty to twenty-nine incidents the Mean Symptoms Index falls again
nearly to the level of two episodes of corporal punishment.13 The
chances of having suicidal thoughts, according to this study, decreases
marginally with one incident of corporal punishment during adolescence,
then rises slightly for three to five episodes of corporal punishment.
For ten to nineteen instances of physical punishment the likelihood of
having suicidal thoughts is approximately the same as it is for those
who are not beaten at all during adolescence. The probability increases
markedly for more than twenty-nine episodes of physical punishment
during one's teens,14 as one would expect when many beatings are
administered. Professor Straus does not provide data about how physical
punishment during (preteen) childhood affects the likelihood of
depression, which would have been interesting given that one might
expect corporal punishment to be psychologically more damaging to
adolescents than to younger children.
Given that even the data
suggesting that very rare instances of mild corporal punishment do have
some negative effects also suggest that the effects are not substantial,
there is a strong likelihood that they could be overridden by other
considerations in a consequentialist calculation. In other words,
showing some negative effects is not sufficient to make a
consequentialist case against all corporal punishment. Other
considerations, including possible advantages of corporal punishment,
would have to be taken into account. Moreover, because the available
evidence shows no serious harm from mild and infrequent corporal
punishment, there seem to be poor grounds for suggesting that for
retributivists the punishment should be regarded as unacceptably severe.
d. Corporal punishment stems from and causes sexual deviance
Those
who want to outlaw corporal punishment often argue that there are
disturbing sexual undercurrents in the practice.15 This objection is, in
part, a special instance of the argument about adverse psychological
effects. In part it is a separate, but related objection. The argument
is that corporal punishment stems from some sexual perversity (on the
part of the person inflicting the punishment) and can in turn cause
sexual deviance (in the person punished). In some versions of this
argument, it is claimed that sadomasochistic relationships can develop
between the beater and the beaten. In other versions, only one party --
usually but not always the beater -- may experience sexual excitement
through the beating. The beaten person may become sexually repressed. It
is no accident, the argument goes, that the buttocks are often chosen
as the site on the body to which the punishment is administered.
Those
who advance the objection that corporal punishment fosters masochism
are rarely clear about the nature of the masochistic inclinations that
they say are produced. Yet, it is crucial to be clear about this.
Studies show that most people have been sexually aroused, either in
fantasy or in practice, by at least some mild masochistic activity, such
as restraint or play fights.16 Thus, some masochistic tendencies seem
to be statistically normal. That does not preclude their being
undesirable, but it is hard to see how, in an era of increased tolerance
of diversity in sexual orientation and practice, we can consistently
label mild masochism as perverse. If such inclinations increase
opportunities for sexual pleasure without concomitant harms, then there
is at least a prima facie case for the view that such inclinations are
not to be regretted. And if one objects to those masochistic
inclinations that seek gratification in more serious pain, injury, and
bondage, there is no evidence of which I am aware that mild and
infrequent corporal punishment fosters such inclinations. The available
evidence linking corporal punishment and masochism makes the connection
only with milder forms of masochistic fantasy and practice.
It is,
of course, a concern that some parents or teachers might derive sexual
gratification from beating children, but is it a reason to eliminate or
ban the practice? Someone might suggest that it is, if the anticipated
sexual pleasure led to beatings that were inappropriate -- either
because children were beaten when they should not have been, or if the
punishment were administered in an improper manner. However, if this is
the concern, surely the fitting response would be to place limitations
on the use of the punishment and, at least in schools, to monitor and
enforce compliance. Here we are not without examples to follow. For
example, given the intimacy of a medical examination, the doctor-patient
relationship is one that is prone to sexual undercurrents. Needless to
say, it is a disturbing thought that doctors may be sexually aroused
while examining patients, but we cannot (easily) monitor that. Our
response then, is to lay down guidelines to curb any abuses that might
ensue. I am aware that medical examinations are necessary in a way in
which corporal punishment is not, but corporal punishment might
nonetheless fulfill an important function.
e. Corporal punishment teaches the wrong lesson
It
is often said that punishing a wrongdoer by inflicting pain conveys the
message that violence is an appropriate way to settle differences or to
respond to problems.17 One teaches the child that if one dislikes what
somebody does, it is acceptable to inflict pain on that person.
This
implicit message is believed to reach the level of a contradiction in
those cases where the child is hit for having committed some act of
violence -- like assaulting another child. Where this happens, it is
claimed, the child is given the violent message that violence is wrong.
The child is told that he was wrong to commit an act of violence and yet
the parent or the teacher conveys this message through violence.
Not
only are such messages thought to be wrong in themselves, but it is
claimed that they are then acted upon by the child who is hit.18 In the
short term, those who are physically punished are alleged to commit
violence against other children, against teachers and against school
property.19 As far as long term effects are concerned, it is alleged
that significant numbers of people who commit crimes were physically
punished as children. It is these arguments that lie behind the adage
"violence breeds violence." Three defenses of (limited) corporal
punishment can be advanced against this objection.
First,
there is a reductio ad absurdum. The argument about the message
implicit in violence seems to prove too much. If we suggest that hitting
a wrongdoer imparts the message that violence is a fitting means to
resolve conflict, then surely we should be committed to saying that
detaining a child or imprisoning a convict conveys the message that
restricting liberty is an appropriate manner to deal with people who
displease one. We would also be required to concede that fining people
conveys the message that forcing others to give up some of their
property is an acceptable way to respond to those who act in a way that
one does not like. If beatings send a message, why don't detentions,
imprisonments, fines, and a multitude of other punishments convey
equally undesirable messages? The argument proves too much because it
proves that all punishment conveys inappropriate messages and so is
wrong. It is a reductio because this conclusion is absurd.
Those who want to replace punishment with therapy would not be immune to
the reductio either. Providing therapy would convey the message that
people with whom one disagrees are to be viewed as sick and deserving of
treatment.
This leads to the second argument. The objection takes
too crude a view of human psychology and the message that punishment
can impart. There is all the difference in the world between legitimate
authorities -- the judiciary, parents, or teachers -- using punitive
powers responsibly to punish wrongdoing, and children or private
citizens going around beating each other, locking each other up, and
extracting financial tributes (such as lunch money). There is a vast
moral difference here and there is no reason why children should not
learn about it. Punishing children when they do wrong seems to be one
important way of doing this. To suggest that children and others cannot
extract this message, but only the cruder version that the objection
suggests, is to underestimate the expressive function of punishment and
people's ability to comprehend it.
There is a possible response to
my arguments. Perhaps it is true that, conceptually, the message that
punishment conveys is more sophisticated. Nevertheless, those who are
beaten do commit violence against others. It might not be that they got
this message from the punishment, but that being subject to the willful
infliction of pain causes rage and this gets vented through acts of
violence on others. This brings me to my third response. There is
insufficient evidence that the properly restricted use of corporal
punishment causes increased violence. Although Murray Straus's study
suggests that there is a correlation between rare corporal punishment
and increased violence, the study has some significant defects, as I
noted earlier, and the significance of his findings has been questioned
in the light of other studies.20 Nevertheless, Professor Straus's
findings cannot be ignored and they suggest that further research, this
time of an experimental sort, should be conducted. Note again, however,
that even if it were shown that there is some increase in violence,
something more is required in order to make a moral case against the
corporal punishment that causes it. On a consequentialist view, for
example, one would have to show that this negative effect is not
overridden by any benefits there might be to corporal punishment.
f. Corporal punishment, pupils, teachers, and authority
Next
there is a cluster of arguments about the relationship between corporal
punishment and teacher-pupil relations.21 These arguments make
reference to what physical punishment says about such relations, what it
does to them, and the impact that this has on education.
First,
it is claimed that for a teacher to employ corporal punishment indicates
that the teacher has failed to discourage pupil wrongdoing in other
ways -- by moral authority, by a system of rewards, or by milder
punishments.
I am sympathetic to the claim that far too many
teachers fail to foster an atmosphere of mutual respect between their
pupils and themselves. They lack the ability or the inclination verbally
to communicate expectations to children -- first gently and then more
strenuously. They do not first employ milder forms of punishment but
rather resort to the cane in the first instance. Some might not believe
in rewarding good behavior, only in punishing bad. However, from the
claim that corporal punishment often indicates teacher failure, we
cannot infer that it necessarily demonstrates such failure or even that
as a matter of fact it always does. It is true that when the teacher
resorts to corporal punishment this indicates that his prior efforts to
discourage the wrongdoing failed. However, there is a big difference
between this, a failure in the pupil, and a failure in the teacher. In
either case it is true, in some sense, that the teacher failed to
discourage the child from doing wrong -- failed to prevent failure in
the child. However, it is not a failure for which the teacher
necessarily is responsible. I am well aware that the responsibility for
children's wrongdoing is all too often placed exclusively at the door of
children themselves, without due attention to the influences to which
they are subjected. However, there is a danger that in rejecting this
incorrect evaluation, teachers (and parents) will be blamed for all
shortcomings in children.
This argument can be strengthened
further. If we say that corporal punishment indicates the failure of
prior efforts, then we must concede that the immediately prior efforts
-- say, detaining the child -- equally indicate the failure of the still
earlier efforts --admonition -- that indicate the failure of yet
earlier efforts -- moral example. Once we see this, it becomes clearer
why, although it is the case that earlier efforts may have failed, it is
not sufficient to say that the failure is in the teacher. To reject
this would lead to the conclusion that the teacher is responsible for
the child's not following the teacher's moral example. We can now also
see why the argument that corporal punishment indicates failure is as
much an argument against any of the prior attempts (except the first) to
prevent wrongdoing.
Just as school corporal punishment is seen by
its opponents as originating in failed pedagogical relationships, so it
is believed to compromise them further. Thus it is perceived as
exacerbating the very problems from which it arises. The pupils, it is
said, begin to fear their teachers and view them as enemies rather than
concerned custodians charged with furthering their well-being and
development, both mental and otherwise. Education does not thrive in an
atmosphere in which children live in fear of those who teach them.22
This opens the way for another objection in this cluster of
arguments-that physically punishing children leads to an unquestioning
acceptance of authority. If children fear their teachers, they are
unlikely to ask questions or challenge views that their teachers present
to them. The idea here is that children can be beaten into submission
to authority.
Again, I have some sympathy for these arguments --
if they are seen to be making the weaker claim that sometimes (even
often) teacher-pupil relations are damaged by corporal punishment. I
agree too that children can and have been beaten into unquestioning
acceptance of authority. Where teachers regularly resort to using the
cane and then use it with excessive force, I can well imagine their
relationships with their pupils being compromised. Teachers who
regularly and severely hit pupils are feared, not respected (though
characteristically such teachers are unable to distinguish between the
two). In such circumstances it would not surprise me at all if the
inquiring, critical capacities of children were dampened or
extinguished. However, I disagree that these are inevitable consequences
of corporal punishment per se. I cannot see any reason for thinking
that infrequent and mild corporal punishment would be likely to have any
of these effects.
Furthermore, we should note that it is not only
corporal punishment that can impact negatively on the educational
relationship. Children who are frequently detained, banished from the
classroom, or even rebuked (especially when this is done scathingly and
publicly) can suffer feelings of alienation from their teachers. One
does not have to resort to sticks to force children into submission. The
tongue can do just as well. My argument here is not to justify one evil
by the existence of another. The point is that just as in these cases
we attack the excesses not the practices themselves, so should we attack
only the abusive use of corporal punishment.
It makes a big
difference not only how frequently and severely corporal punishment is
inflicted, but also the kinds of behavior for which it is administered.
Where children are beaten for expressing unpopular ideas or for asking
too many questions, the argument that it will lead to subservience to
authority is greatly strengthened. Similarly, if children are paddled
for not displaying servile deference to teachers, the relationship
between them and their teachers is sure to suffer. However, if children
are punished for genuine wrongdoing -- lying, cheating, stealing,
bullying -- then the message is that this behavior is unacceptable.
Teachers can foster critical inquiry and support the right to express
even unpopular opinions, while at the same time punishing genuine
wrongdoing. Children are able to distinguish between these.
g. Corporal punishment does not deter
Some
opponents of corporal punishment have suggested that it is not an
effective form of punishment because it does not deter those punished
from further wrongdoing. If the argument were sound, it would be
significant for those whose justification of punishment is
consequentialist. However, the argument would have no force against a
retributivist theory, according to which a punishment can be deserved
whether or not it is effective.
Some of the arguments for why
corporal punishment does not deter draw on research that suggests that
for punishment to be effective it must meet certain conditions --
conditions that would be impossible (and perhaps also undesirable) to
fulfill. Thus, it is argued that effective punishment must follow
wrongdoing instantaneously.23 It is also claimed that for punishment to
be effective it would have to follow every (or, at least, nearly every)
act of wrongdoing,24 and therefore would have to be inflicted even more
regularly than it already is. It has been suggested too that punishment
that is inflicted by surprise is more effective than punishment that is
expected. Insofar as the research methodology is sound and actually
supports these conclusions -- conditions that I do not think are met --
the conclusions would apply equally to other forms of punishment. In
other words, the argument is not specifically against corporal
punishment, but against punishment generally. This implication is all
too often not made explicit.
Deterrence is not an all-or-nothing
matter. A punishment might have some deterrent effect without being
extremely effective. Once this is recognized, the mere continued
existence of wrongdoing does not demonstrate the failure of punishment
as a deterrent, as many have thought. To know how effective punishment
is one must know what the incidence of the wrongdoing would be if prior
punishments for it had not been inflicted. To establish this, much more
research needs to be done. However, there is already some evidence of
the deterrent effect of corporal punishment, at least with very young
children.25 Such findings cannot be considered decisive, but neither can
they be ignored.
Finally, while we might expect increased
frequency to improve the deterrent effect, there is good reason to think
that the reverse might be true. The expressive function as well as the
aura surrounding a particular form of punishment might well be enhanced
by inflicting it less often. If one uses physical punishment
infrequently, it can speak louder than if one inflicts it at every turn.
The special status accorded it by its rare use might well provide
psychological reason to avoid it out of proportion to its actual
severity.
h. Do the arguments gain strength in numbers?
Up
to now I have considered in turn each of the objections to corporal
punishment. I have argued that each by itself fails. Do they gain any
strength in numbers?
We need
to distinguish between two ways an objection may fail: 1) because it
rests on premises for which there is insufficient or no evidence; or 2)
because the premises, although substantiated by sufficient evidence, do
not lead to the desired conclusion. Objections that fail for
the first reason cannot be strengthened by association with others. They
fail whether they stand alone or in company. For example, if there is
no evidence that corporal punishment causes severe masochism, then the
evidence is not increased because there is some distinct argument that
says something quite different about corporal punishment. However, it is
another matter where an objection is flawed because although there is
evidence for its premises, the premises are insufficiently strong to
support the objection. If, as I have argued is not the case, the
evidence were compelling that mild and infrequent corporal punishment
slightly elevated the chances of violent physical abuse, then, ex
hypothesi, the premise that such corporal punishment has this effect
would be substantiated. However, this premise by itself would be
insufficient to demonstrate the wrongfulness of corporal punishment. A
mere increase in the chance of abuse is inadequate by itself, but it
might be one consideration that, when added to others, contributes to a
satisfactory case against corporal punishment.
I have argued that
the objections to mild and infrequent corporal punishment fail because
there is insufficient evidence for their premises. Accordingly, they are
not stronger when considered together. I have indicated that some
recent studies suggest that further research might yield satisfactory
evidence. Other studies, including a review of 35 peer-reviewed
empirical investigations about the outcomes of corporal punishment by
parents cast doubt on this.26 But if further research does assuage these
doubts and bolster the premises of the objections to corporal
punishment, then a further question will arise: Are the harms that the
research demonstrates sufficiently strong, when considered together, to
render the practice morally wrong? But until we have the data this
question cannot be answered.
3. Considering the Case for Corporal Punishment
Having
rejected the arguments that support the total abandonment of corporal
punishment, I shall now raise some positive arguments for preserving the
option of limited corporal punishment.
a. Corporal punishment punishes only the guilty
It
has been argued that one advantage that corporal punishment has over
other forms of punishment is that it punishes only the guilty.27
Detaining students often places a burden on parents who fetch children
from school. They are then required to fetch the detained child at a
later time, which may be inconvenient. If the parent has more than one
child at the school, then detention of one of the children can result in
two separate trips to the school. These consequences seem unjust to
some because not only the guilty suffer.
I think that this
argument has some force. In other words, there might well be certain
instances in which this morally relevant consideration will tip the
balance in favor of inflicting corporal punishment, rather than opting
for some other form of punishment. However, there will often be other
competing considerations. These include the concerns about the dangers
of frequent use of canings. Thus, if excessive use of corporal
punishment would lead to unacceptable psychological damage, then
inflicting an alternative form of punishment might be justified even if
it imposes some burden on family members.
Members of a family do
not stand in isolation from one another. They are affected by what each
of the others does and by what happens to each. When one member of a
family performs a meritorious deed or has some good fortune, others in
the family benefit. Similarly, if someone in the family does wrong or
suffers some harm, this negatively affects the others. To a certain
extent these "spill-overs" are an expected and legitimate part of family
life.
Here we see an important distinction arising, one which is
conflated by the argument that corporal punishment punishes only the
guilty. It ignores the distinction by using the term "punish" in a weak
sense. It claims that by detaining a wrongdoer, we also punish his
family. But, of course, we do not punish the family. The detention may
well cause the hardship, but that is quite different from punishing it.
Punishment is not simply the suffering of hardship. First, it must be
imposed. It is at least a matter of controversy whether the hardship is
imposed on the family, or whether it is merely an unfortunate
consequence. Second, the hardship the family suffers carries none of the
condemnation that punishment conveys.28 Some, but not all, of the force
of the argument at hand is derived from glossing over these
differences.
b. Corporal punishment in the scale of punishments
A
more compelling argument in favor of the limited use of corporal
punishment is that it plays a significant role on the scale of
punishments. In the context of a school, it fills an important position
between punishments like detention on the one hand, and expulsion on the
other. There is some value in having a scale of punishments of
discernibly increasing severity. It is true that some scale could be
introduced without corporal punishment. One might, for example, replace
corporal punishment with detention of longer duration. However, having
different forms of punishment that vary in severity can enhance the
expressive function of punishment by making the varying degrees of
condemnation more explicit.
c. Being beaten is not a good in itself
Corporal
punishment has another advantage. Many teachers are concerned that
assigning extra work or requiring community service ought not to be used
as punishments. This is because work and community service are seen by
teachers as being good in themselves. While a child might not want to
perform these activities, and so requiring them would be to inflict a
hardship, one would be reinforcing the child's resistance to these
practices. Not only would the child continue to dislike working or
helping in the community, but he would come to associate these
activities with punishment. This is why some teachers, when punishing
children, prefer to require activities like detention or writing lines
that are not good in themselves and are unpleasant. In this regard,
corporal punishment is like these latter activities. It differs from
these others in the intensity of its unpleasantness. This consideration
reinforces the argument that corporal punishment occupies an important
place in the scale of punishments. It becomes a significant substitute
for something like community service.
d. Child-rearing and parents' liberty interests
We
have seen that there is room for reasonable people to disagree about
the value of corporal punishment in rearing and educating a child.
Contrary to the views of those who oppose all physical punishment, it is
not implausible to think that such punishment, if inflicted under the
appropriate conditions, might do some good. If corporal punishment does
indeed have some benefit, then this would be lost if the practice were
abandoned. From the perspective of public policy, prohibiting corporal
punishment would constitute a serious interference with the liberty
interests of those parents who judge the possibility of corporal
punishment to benefit their children. Such liberty interests would be
overridable if there were compelling evidence of the harmfulness of
corporal punishment, but the inconclusive data we currently have provide
no such grounds.
4. Some Requirements for the Just Infliction of Corporal Punishment
Corporal
punishment can be unjust in a multitude of ways. Here I shall discuss a
partial list of conditions for just corporal punishment.
a. Infrequent pain without injury
Given
the overwhelming evidence about the evils of frequent and severe
beatings, they should be judged to be wrong. If children are to be hit
it should be only infrequently and then so as to cause pain without
injury.
If one accepts the pain without injury view (or something
close to it), there are a number of conditions that will be important.
One of these is the site on the body where the punishment will be
administered. We would have to rule out those parts of the body where
injury is likely to result. Attention would also have to be given to the
implement used. Implements that are more prone to cause injury would be
ruled out. Finally, the number and intensity of the blows would have to
be calculated to avoid any chance of injury. The difficulties of
measuring force are often cited. One would have to err on the side of
caution. The courts are often called upon to pass judgment on questions
of "reasonableness," even "reasonable force." There is no reason why,
with more appropriate legislation to provide guidelines, similar
judgments could not be made in cases in which excessive corporal
punishment is charged.
b. Nondiscrimination
It is well
known that often minority groups and especially males receive a
disproportionate share of corporal punishment.29 In some countries,
corporal punishment of females is outlawed, while it is legal and widely
practiced on males.
If corporal punishment is to be just, it must
be inflicted without consideration for differences in race and sex. If
girls are not caned for the same offenses for which boys are caned, then
the boys are the victims of discriminatory treatment. Discrimination
against women and girls in many areas has justifiably been an object of
concern. However, there has been scant attention to those social
practices that discriminate against men and boys. It seems clear to me
that the discriminatory use of corporal punishment on the basis of race
and sex is immoral. I should like to think that little if any argument
is required to convince people in our society of this. However, I cannot
discount the possibility that some will think that gender differences
are relevant. Some might suggest, for example, that girls ought to be
treated more gently than boys because girls have a more delicate
constitution. I do not see how this kind of view can be reconciled with
the widespread views in western society that it is wrong to treat people
differently on the basis of gender (or racial or religious)
stereotypes. While some girls may be more delicate and sensitive than
some boys, some boys are more delicate and sensitive than some girls. To
treat people differently on the basis of gender rather than on an
individual basis is to engage in unfair discrimination. I realize that
not all societies share this view. It would be beyond the scope of this
paper to examine which view is correct, though my sympathies are clear.
Societies that do accept the liberal principles of nondiscrimination
must consistently apply these principles.
Treating males and
females equally with regard to corporal punishment would have the added
benefit of countering the cult of machismo that sometimes surrounds
physical punishment. If females are known to be subject to the same
punishments, there will be nothing specifically "manly" about a caning.
This may even increase the deterrent effect of the punishment because
boys would feel less need to prove themselves by inviting it, and girls
would know that they were not immune. Equally punishing boys and girls
undermines rather than perpetuates gender stereotypes.
c. Due process
Due
process is important for any theory of punishment. On a retributivist
theory, for any punishment to be just it must be inflicted only on
guilty parties and then only in proportion to the wrongdoing. Due
process is required to determine innocence or guilt and its extent.
Utilitarians are also concerned about punishing only the guilty and in
proportion to wrongdoing, even if their concern about these conditions
is merely instrumental and so theoretically overridable.
Due
process is no less important for punishments inflicted on children in
families and schools -- primarily for reasons of justice but
additionally for the purposes of teaching moral lessons about
retributive justice. It would be a mistake, however, to think that we
are required to institute fully fledged trials before independent
judges, with defense attorneys and prosecutors, before punishment is
justified in homes and schools. That would be impractical and invasive
of the privacy of families. It seems sufficient for a parent or teacher
to inquire into a matter in order to establish the facts and to allow a
child to defend himself against the accusation of wrongdoing.
d. Timing
There
is some debate about the appropriate timing for punishment of children
in general. Some think that it should follow as soon after the
wrongdoing as possible in order to make explicit the connection between
the offense and the punishment. In the case of very young children I am
inclined to agree. They, like the animals on whom "punishment" studies
are done, are unable to draw the connection between a wrong done at one
time and a punishment inflicted much later. However, I believe that
children at school already have the capacity to understand that a
punishment inflicted now can be for a wrong committed at some
significantly earlier time.
There are two additional reasons to
favor (somewhat) delayed punishment. First, it allows time for due
process. It would be completely inappropriate to rush into punishment
without the necessary inquiries. However, the second reason provides
important grounds for delaying corporal punishment. This is the idea
that it would be wrong to beat a child in anger. Some think that this is
precisely the only time when one should hit a child -- to eliminate the
aura of a cold-blooded assault,30 or to show the child that the beating
was a natural reaction to the wrongdoing. Quite to the contrary, I
think that we need to avoid spur-of-the-moment beatings of passion. They
are and appear to be more of a loss of temper and control than a
punishment. Similarly, the punishment must not be and look like a reflex
reaction to wrongdoing. Not only would beatings in anger remove the
possibility of due process, but they would also teach the wrong lessons
about what just punishment ought to be -- cool and methodical, not
passionate. Children are likely to be punished more often and more
severely if it is done in anger. The parent or teacher should allow some
time to elapse before inflicting corporal punishment. With tempers
cooled and the perspective of some temporal distance from the event, the
punishing adult is in a better situation to conduct a fair inquiry and
determine an appropriate punishment. The child also has the opportunity
to reflect on the wrongdoing prior to the punishment. Children, like
adults, are often more susceptible to repentant feelings during the
period between doing wrong and being punished than in the time following
punishment.
e. Safeguards
It might be asked what
safeguards could be introduced in order to prevent unjust corporal
punishment. In schools there are numerous possibilities. First there
could be restrictions on 1) the offenses for which the child may be
physically punished; 2) the implement used to inflict the punishment; 3)
the number of blows; 4) the places on the body to which such punishment
may be administered. These and other requirements could be monitored in
a variety of ways. For example, it could be required that all
punishments and reasons for punishments be approved by the principal, or
that a teacher other than the punisher be present during punishment, or
that parents be notified of all physical punishments. School
psychologists or inspectors could interview children from time to time
about punitive practices. Punishment within families is less easily
monitored, at least if we are to respect people's privacy. But because
it is even more difficult to monitor parental compliance with an
unqualified ban on corporal punishment than it is to monitor parental
compliance with a ban on only severe physical punishment, this
monitoring problem provides no support for the elimination of all
corporal punishment in homes. Rather what is called for is a
sensitization of those (such as doctors and teachers as well as children
themselves) who are well placed to detect abusive punishment. That is
the very mechanism we use to detect other forms of abuse of children.
5. Conclusion
I
have argued that corporal punishment is not always immoral. With
appropriate restrictions and safeguards, it is sometimes permissible.
There is a danger that the position I have advanced will be
misunderstood. This danger lies partly in the polarization of views
about corporal punishment, such that those who hold the polar views are
not sensitive to an intermediate position. However, it is also partly
attributable to the form this paper has taken. I have suggested a
battery of arguments against the opponent of corporal punishment. Some
positive arguments for this form of punishment were also raised. This
may create the impression that mine is a vigorous defense of beating
children for wrongdoing. In fact, nothing could be further from the
truth.
In the first instance, my arguments, although lengthy, have
been directed against a radical yet commonly held view -- that corporal
punishment should never be inflicted. I have sought to show that this
position is untenable, even though the arguments for it do show that
frequent and severe physical punishment is morally wrong.
Second,
although I think that corporal punishment is sometimes justified, I
nevertheless feel uncomfortable about the idea of people being punished
physically. I have a distinct distaste for the practice, and in the
years that I taught school children I never resorted to corporal
punishment. It may seem, then, as though my moral intuitions do not
match my theoretical commitments. However, I think that an unease about
corporal punishment is perfectly compatible with my theoretical
position. There are many unpleasant practices that, although sometimes
justified, should never be gleefully embraced. For example, it is
sometimes justified to take another person's life, as in the case of
self-defense, yet even in these circumstances we would judge the killer
to be morally defective if he enjoyed or even failed to detest his
killing of the aggressor. A killing is to be regretted even when it is
justified.
Finally, many of the arguments about corporal
punishment rest, at least in part, on empirical questions. Indeed, as I
have said, these are difficult matters to settle. My view is that the
empirical data, insofar as I have understood them, are insufficient to
defend the extreme view that physical punishment should never be
administered.
Nevertheless we should remain open to the fruits of further research and be prepared to adapt our views accordingly.31
Notes
1.
For an horrific list of offenses for which school children in South
Africa have been physically punished, see T.L. Holdstock, "Violence in
Schools: Discipline," in Brian McKendrick and Wilma Hoffmann (eds.),
People and Violence in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press,
1990), pp. 348, 349. There is extensive record of the kinds of offenses
for which children in American schools have been subject to physical
punishment. See, for example, Adah Maurer, "It Does Happen Here," in
Irwin Hyman and James Wise (eds.), Corporal Punishment in American
Education (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979).
2. The
most well-known case that was brought before the United States courts is
that of Ingraham v. Wright. Briefly, the facts of the case are that on 6
October 1970 a group of pupils at Drew Junior High School in Florida
were slow in leaving the stage of the school auditorium when a teacher
asked them to do so. The principal, Willie Wright, Jr., took the pupils
to his office to be paddled. One pupil, 14-year-old James Ingraham,
refused to accept the punishment. An assistant principal and an
assistant to the principal held Ingraham prone across a table while
Wright hit the child over twenty times with a paddle. The beating caused
a hematoma, from which fluid later oozed. A doctor had to prescribe
painkillers, laxatives, sleeping pills and ice packs. The child had to
rest at home for over ten days and could not sit comfortably for three
weeks. There are numerous other instances of corporal punishment in
American schools that are less well known but no less serious.
3.
I mean here physical injury. To include psychological injury would be
to rule out many objections to corporal punishment -- those that suggest
that all physical punishment results in psychological injury. I want to
reject this view, but by argument rather than stipulation. I am happy
to stipulate the absence of physical injury because the claim that all
corporal punishment results in such injury is more demonstrably false.
4.
There is a further argument -- that corporal punishment violates
constitutional provisions against cruel punishment. I shall not attend
to this argument here, but I do so in "The Child, the Rod and the Law"
in Acta Juridica, 1996, pp. 197-214; repr. in Raylene Keightley (ed.),
Children's Rights (Kenwyn: Juta and Co., 1996).
5. Adah Maurer,
"The Case Against Corporal Punishment in Schools," in John Cryan (ed.),
Corporal Punishment in the Schools: Its Use is Abuse (Toledo: University
of Toledo, 1981), p. 22.
6. Murray A. Straus, Beating the Devil
Out of Them: Corporal Punishment in American Families (New York:
Lexington Books, 1994), p. 81. He does concede, however, that not all
studies have supported the idea that abusive parents use corporal
punishment more than nonabusive parents (p. 84).
7. For references to both kinds of study, see Straus, Beating the Devil Out of Them, pp. 83-84.
8.
Richard J. Gelles and Ake W. Edfeldt, "Violence Towards Children in the
United States and Sweden," Child Abuse and Neglect 10 (1986): 501-10.
9.
E.g., Holdstock, "Violence in Schools: Discipline," pp. 356, 357;
Richard Dubanoski, Michel Inaba, and Kent Gerkewicz, "Corporal
Punishment in Schools: Myths, Problems and Alternatives," Child Abuse
and Neglect 7 (1983): 271-78, p. 274; Straus, Beating the Devil Out of
Them, chap. 5.
10. Straus, Beating the Devil Out of Them.
11.
E.g., John Rosemond, "Should the Use of Corporal Punishment By Parents
Be Considered Child Abuse? -- No," in Mary Ann Mason and Eileen Gambrill
(eds.), Debating Children's Lives: Current Controversies on Children
and Adolescents (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 215.
12. Straus, Beating the Devil Out of Them, p. 167.
13.
Ibid., p. 70. The (adjusted) increase for one episode of corporal
punishment is only two points on the index. For two episodes of corporal
punishment, there is a decrease of nearly one point on the index. The
index then rises five points for nineteen instances of corporal
punishment.
14. Ibid., p. 73. I have described the data that were adjusted to control for other variables.
15.
See, for example, Adah Maurer, "Corporal Punishment," American
Psychologist (August 1974), p. 621; Holdstock, "Violence in Schools:
Discipline," pp. 358-59; Straus, Beating the Devil Out of Them, chap. 8.
16. Straus, Beating the Devil Out of Them, pp. 126-29.
17.
E.g., Irwin Hyman, Anthony Bongiovanni, Robert Friedman, and Eileen
McDowell, "Paddling, Punishing and Force: Where Do We Go From Here?"
Children Today 6 (Sept.-Oct. 1997): 17-23, p. 20; Adah Maurer, "The Case
Against Corporal Punishment in Schools," p. 19.
18. Maurer, "The Case Against Corporal Punishment in Schools," p. 20.
19. Dubanoski et al., "Corporal Punishment in Schools," p. 274.
20.
Robert Larzelere, "Should the Use of Corporal Punishment By Parents Be
Considered Child Abuse? -- No," in Mason and Gambrill (eds.), Debating
Children's Lives, pp. 204-9.
21. E.g., Holdstock, "Violence in
Schools: Discipline," pp. 353-54, 360-61; Hyman et al., "Paddling,
Punishing and Force," p. 20.
22. E.g., Holdstock, "Violence in Schools: Discipline," p. 353; Dubanoski et al., "Corporal Punishment in Schools," p. 273.
23.
One study cited by opponents of corporal punishment is that of Richard
Walters and Lillian Demkow, "Timing of Punishment as a Determinant of
Response Inhibition," Child Development 34 (1963): 207-14. The study is
not specifically about corporal punishment. The punishment used was a
loud unpleasant sound from a buzzer.
24. Hyman et al., "Paddling, Punishing and Force," p. 19.
25.
Robert E. Larzelere, William N. Schneider, David B. Larson, and
Patricia L. Pike, "The Effects of Discipline Responses in Delaying
Toddler Misbehavior Recurrences," Child and Family Behavior Therapy 18
(1996): 35-57.
26. Robert E. Larzelere, "A Review of the Outcomes
of Parental Use of Nonabusive or Customary Physical Punishment,"
Pediatrics 98, Supplement (1996): 824-28.
27. Graeme Newman,
Just and Painful: A Case for Corporal Punishment of Criminals (New York: Macmillan, 1983), p. 43.
28. However, as in other forms of punishment, there may be a moral stigma for the family.
29.
E.g., Steven Shaw and Jeffrey Braden, "Race and Gender Bias in the
Administration of Corporal Punishment," School Psychology Review 19
(1990): 378-83.
30. George Bernard Shaw, cited with approval by
Gertrude J. Rubin Williams, "Corporal Punishment: Socially Sanctioned
Assault and Battery," in Cryan (ed.), Corporal Punishment in the
Schools, p. 37.
31. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers whose comments have helped me improve this paper.
Best regards,
